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LEGAL WRITINGS ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
PAUL H. SANDERS*

AND JOHN W. WADE*

This review does not purport to provide a complete critique of the
various works in the field of Statutory Construction. It is not directed primarily to the specialist. Instead, it is intended to bring together for the
benefit of the general practitioner the various books and other writings on
the subject and thus amounts essentially to a bibliography. 1 But an effort has
been made to suggest the approach of the longer works and to estimate in
some measure their value. Thus this symposium on the subject of Statutory
Construction can be rounded out by providing convenient reference to other
writings in the field.
TEXTS AND TREATISES

Unlike many legal fields, Statutory Construction has not been the subject
of an extensive collection of legal treatises. But there are a number of
valuable works-some contemporary and some of earlier date.
Horack's Sutherland on Statutory Construction.2 -This is the outstanding treatise in the field and a standard American reference work. Building on
a widely used and quoted authority Professor Horack, in the three volumes
of the third edition, has rendered a notable service to the legal profession
by covering completely the problems of legislation, including legislative organization and procedure, the classification of statutes and statutory interpretation. The coverage is thorough and the footnotes are exhaustive, affording
one the opportunity of selecting the appropriate holding for particular jurisdictions. Divisions of authority are clearly recognized and considered. The
emphasis of the work is that of providing working tools rather than exhausting the possibilities of critical analysis and commentary. As the author of
the third edition says in the preface, "It sets forth the customary rules of
construction and seeks to evalue them in terms of their usefulness; and then,
because all rules are meaningful only as .they apply to specific circumstances,
to consider in many chapters the application of the rules of interpretation
to particular fields of the law." He disagrees witl his predecessor concerning
the status of legislation. "The third edition reflects the growing acceptance
of statutes as a creative element in the law rather than, as Sutherland suggested in the first edition, as 'legislative interference.! "
* Professor of Lav, Vanderbilt University.

1. For other bibliographies see POUND, OUTLINES OF A COURSE ON LEGISLATION 55
(1934); LIE ER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HER)MIENEUTIcS 229 (3d ed., Hammond, 1880);

Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REV. 388, 424 (1942).
2. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d ed., Horack, 1943). 3 vols. Cal-

laghan & Co., Chicago, Ill. (1st ed. 1891).
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Crawford, The Construction of Statutes.3-In spite of its title this work
actually covers a much greater portion of the field of legislation, including
the constitutional basis of legislative power, the delegation of such power
and the organization and procedure of legislative bodies. Actually only 12 of
the 31 chapters deal with what might be termed the principles of statutory
construction. All of the other material, however, would be most useful to
lawyers concerned in any capacity with any phase of legislation. The work
includes references not only to standard treatises, but to lav review materials
and some of the more modem writers in the field of jurisprudence. It goes
beyond any routine collection of case holdings by raising such questions of
current controversy as "Is there a legislative intent?" The use of legislative
histories and other extrinsic aids is dealt with in detail and the author does
not hesitate to give his own ideas with respect to controversial issues. The
work is a very acceptable and useful single-volume contribution to the understanding of problems of statutory construction and to the needs of lawyers
in dealing with such problems.
Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes.4-This recent edition of a standard
English authority is an extremely useful exposition in compact form of the

law of statutory construction in a single common law jurisdiction which has
been faced with the problem of interpreting and applying statutes for many
hundreds of years. The wealth of case material cited in the 445 pages of
text is indicated by a table of cases 124 pages in length. There are some
discussions of the development of certain rules, of "trends" and "modern
rules," in the work, but it is largely a noncritical presentation of the application of the various rules, canons, presumptions, etc., of construction as
revealed by English cases. The treatment is reminiscent of certain American
legal encyclopedias which read as if all cases were decided at the same time,
and were capable of being stated rather dognatically as part of a single harmonious legal pattern, in all respects unconflicting and equally applicable
at a particular moment.
The sintilarities and differences between the English and American approaches are suggested by the following: "A statute is the will of the Legislature, and the fundamental rule of interpretation, to which all others are
subordinate, is that a statute is to be expounded 'according to the intent of
them that made it.'" (P. 1). "But it is unquestionably a rule that what may
be called the parliamentary history of an enactment is not admissible to
explain its meanings." (P. 29).
Craies, Statute Law. 5-This English text devotes only one part to
3. CRAwFoRD, THE CoxsTmucrxoN OF STATUTES (1940). Pp. xvi, 1008. Thomas
Law Book Co., St. Louis, Mo.
4. MAXWELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (9th ed., Jackson, 1946). Pp.
cxxxii, 445. Sweet & MaxwelI, London. (Ist ed. 1875).
5. CRAIES, A TREATISE ON STATUTE LAW (4th ed., Scott, 1936). Pp. iv, 568. Sweet
& Maxwell, London. (Comments based on 3d ed., Pease and Gorman, 1923). This work
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statutory construction. There is some preliminary material on drafting and
authentication of statutes which includes consideration of procedural irregularities. Also some of the material on the effect of statutes seems virtually
substantive in character. Nevertheless, the greater portion of the material,
no matter in which part presented, is pertinent to the subject of statutory
construction. The work does not assume to cover or cite all cases where
words in a statute have been the subject of interpretation but centers attention
on the cases discussing the principles of statutory construction. The book
proceeds under the assumption that-there are rules as to statutory construction and interpretation, that such rules are knowable and deducible from
court decisions and dicta, and that these rules can be arranged in a meaningful system. However, this is mixed with a healthy skepticism and objectivity
which does not permit the adoption of merely mechanical approaches. Any
lawyer would find the book a helpful one for the historical background it
gives for many familiar legal problems not necessarily associated with statutory construction. The work refers to "the United States rule" from time
to time and it is stated that the writers have relied heavily upon the work
of Sedgwick throughout the treatise. There is a brief review of the contributions of the early English writers, Comyn, Vining, Bacon and the relevant
parts of Coke's Institutes.
Allen, Law in the Making. 6-For a generalized treatment of legal history
and the topics normally associated with jurisprudence this work is one of
the best single volumes available. Written by a former Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, it is, of course, concerned primarily with the English
legal system; but it ranges far beyond merely the common law tradition to
work into its pattern the various "schools," "philosophers," and legal systems
of the European continent and elsewhere. Chapter six is entitled "Legislation"
and one of the five divisions of that chapter is entitled "Interpretation of
Legislation." But the 42 pages of this division and the "Excursus B" which
follows it contain a most penetrating analysis and provide more general
illumination on what is being done in England with statutes than is given
elsewhere in volumes.
"We have a most elaborate code, slowly and painfully built up, for
literal interpretation, and there is not a comma or a hyphen which has not
its solemn precedent. No attempt has been made in these pages to enter into
the details of this lore, for it is matter of pure technique which may be found
in many books of reference. There is much reason for thinking that if the
same amount of attention had been paid to the more difficult and elusive
principles of Heydon's case-if, in short, our statutory interpretation had
is based on Hardcastle on Statutory Law, which originally appeared in 1879, Craies
having prepared the second edition of that work in 1892.
6. ALLEN, LAw

IN THE MAKING

Press, Oxford. (1st ed. 1927).

(4th ed. 1946). Pp. xxxii, 564. The Clarendon
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not so weakly followed the line of least resistance-many existing anomalies
in our law might have been avoided." (P. 418).
Black, Construction and Interpretation of the Laws.7-This is one of
the early hornbooks with the usual black letter headings. Black announces

in his preface that his book is not founded on any pre-existing work but is
built up fully from decided cases. He says, "It is no longer assumed to be
the province of the judiciary either to quibble away or to evade the mandates
of the legislature. On the contrary, the modem authorities recognize only
one rule as absolutely unvarying, namely, to seek out and enforce the actual
meaning and will of the law-making power. Thus the doctrine of 'equitable'
interpretation has become obsolete, the sanctity of the common lav is no
longer so jealously insisted upon, and the difference between strict and
liberal construction has been reduced to a minimum." The resulting work
may be looked upon as a major step forward in systematic treatment of the
subject with rules and maxims and presumptions covered thoroughly but
tested in each instance against actual application by the judiciary in recent
cases.
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics.S-The Hammond edition of
this pioneer work has not disturbed in any way the original author's text
of 1839. The editorial contributions consist of extensive supplementary notes.
The approach of both the editor and the original author is that the interpretation of words reduced to an exact form is essentially the same no matter
whether the form be embodied in a statute, a contract or any other instrument. Lieber's main work is not developed upon the basis of decided cases
and he makes no attempt at a complete annotation of the principles which
he announces. The approach, at least in some respects, is that of the modern
semanticist in making clear the symbolic nature of words and the ambiguity
of human speech, which cannot be avoided by specification and amplification.
One of Lieber's principal contributions is his distinction between interpretation
and construction. It may be noted that this purported distinction between
the terms is one which was quoted extensively in other works during the
nineteenth century. It is recognized, of course, that no such precise use of
terminology is reflected in the case law of this subject. Having indicated the
different types of interpretation and construction and the desirable features
and dangers in each of the several types, Lieber then asserts, "We shall now
examine the fundamental principles of every sort of interpretation, applied
in whatever branch, to whatever text." (P. 71). He enumerates nine "elementary principles" of interpretation which include such essentially sound
7. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS
(2d ed. 1911). Pp. xii, 710. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn. (Comments based
on 1st ed. 1896).
8. LIEBER. LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS (3d ed., Hammond, 1880). Pp.
xiv, 352. F. H. Thomas & Co., St. Louis, Mo. (Enlarged ed. 1839). First edition apparently not printed in book form.
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generalities as "There can be no sound interpretation without good faith
and common sense" (P. 109), and "Interpretation is not the object, but a
means; hence superior considerations may exist." (P. 109). In Note I, beginning on page 289, Professor Hammond's editorial note is an extremely
useful criticism of Lieber's enumeration of principles. There are included
sixteen "general principles of construction" which are comparable in tone
to the illustration on interpretation given above. Anyone interested in a full
coverage of the American law on this subject will find here the source of
much that appears in subsequent cases and texts. The scholarship and
analysis of each of the contributors is of a very high order, particularly in
light of the time when the contributions were written.
Sedgwick, Interpretationand Application of Statutory and Constitutional
Law. 9 -This work contains the collection, usual for the period, of rules given
by previous writers, plus the interrelated discussion of constitutional limitations on legislative powers and the substantive law of certain matters covered
by statutes. In spite of his collection of the rules of several authors, the writer
of this work does not seem disposed to regard any approach to the subject
as too authoritative. In fact, the following statement may be considered as
rather remarkable in the extent to which it departs from contemporary views.
"Nor do I believe it easy to prescribe any system of rules of interpretation
for cases of ambiguity in written language, that will really avail to guide the
mind in the decision of doubt. It is with the utmost difficulty, if at all, that
we can define or direct any one intellectual process. How is it to be expected
that we can, with success, lay down rules which are generally to govern the
operations of the mind? The attempt is ingenious, metaphysically curious,
but of little practical utility in the study or the application of the science of
the law. What is required in this department of our science is not formal
rules, or nice terminology, or ingenious classification, but that thorough
intellectual training, that complete education of the mind, which lead it to
a correct result, wholly independently of rules, and, indeed, almost unconscious of the process by which the end is attained. It would seem as vain
to attempt to frame positive and fixed rules of interpretation as to endeavor,
in the same way, to define the mode by which the mind shall draw conclusions
from testimony." (P. 228).
Potter'sDwarris on Statutes.' 0 -The enthusiasm of the American editor
of this work is made apparent in his preface. "An applicant for admission
to the bar ...should be debarred, who shall have advanced no further in
the science of law, than to suppose the rule of interpretation of all statutes
9. SEDGWiCK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed., Pomeroy, 1874). Pp.

xlvii, 692. Voorhis & Co., New York. (Comments based on 1st ed. 1857).
10. DWARRIS, A GENERAL TREATISE ON STATUTES (Potter's Am. ed. 1874). Pp.
xxiv, 693. W. Gould & Son, Albany, N. Y. (1st ed. 1830).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.. 3

was one uniform rule; ... or who could not answer to the distinction between
prospective and retrospective, public and private, enabling and disabling,
enlarging and restraining, affirmative and negative statutes, and to the various
other known divisions, as well as of the particular rules of construction
applicable to each division; and, as applicable also to the various parts of
the same statute; to the title; the preamble; the enacting part; the clauses,
provisos and exceptions; and to the effect which each part bears upon the
whole, and upon its construction." In order to avoid such a "debarring,"
the author proceeds to give all the necessary answers and a considerable
choice of previously announced rules and maxims. Those included in chapter
5 are 19 maxims from Dwarris (some of which are in Latin with no further
explanation); 45 maxims from Vattel (all of which are in English) ; 10 from
Puffendorf; 16 from Grotius; 14 from Rutherford;" 38 extracted from
Domat; and 21 listed under the heading, "American Rules." The greater
part of the book is actually devoted to constitutional law and the substantive
law of particular matters covered by statutes.
Smith, Statutory and Constitutional Construction.2-In addition to the
material presented on statutory construction, this work is of interest because
of the history of legislation among ancient governments, in England and in
the American colonies and states. The constitutional restrictions on legislative
power are developed in a manner which is of particular interest to the constitutional lawyer. Perhaps half of the book's 976 pages are devoted to the
matter of interpretation. There are extensive quotations and references to
other text writers, including Dwarris, Lieber, Rutherford, Vattel, Puffendorf, Domat, Lord Bacon, Plowden, etc., and the several rules announced
are to some extent illustrated by court decisions in particular cases. The system is not altogether satisfactory, however, and to a considerable extent the
approach breaks down into the simple repetition of particular instances and
particular rules without consideration for the interrelationship of such rules.
In fact, a considerable discussion is given to the meaning of specific words
such as "aforesaid," "and," "all," "depending," etc. Separate consideration
is given to penal statutes, affirmative and negative statutes, public and private
statutes. The collection of materials is interesting; the analysis of and systematic development of statutory interpretation is not greatly advanced
by this work.
Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes."a-An obvious value in this work,
11. It may be noted, with reference to the last three authorities mentioned, that
Puffendorf copied many maxims from Grotius and Rutherford copies from both Grotius
and Puffendorf. The author states, however, that he has eliminated such duplications.
12. SMITH, COMMENTARIES ON STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 1876). Pp. xv, 976. Banks & Bros., Albany,
N.Y. (Comments based on 1st ed. 1848).

13.

ENDLICH,

A COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

(1888). Pp.

lxviii, 871. F. D. Linn & Co., Jersey City, N. J. (Founded on Maxwell's 1875 edition).
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in addition to its broad coverage of all phases of statutory interpretation and
construction is the very complete annotation to English and American cases.
The approach of the author is reflected in the foreword, as follows: "The
innumerable maxims and technical rules of statutory interpretation, shrouded
for the most part in a dead language, are well enough known. The difficulty
is in their application." The author states that he has sought, as did Maxwell,
(upon whose work the book is based) not to cast the rules and maxims aside
as useless, but to translate them into a living language and reduce them to
a few easily grasped obvious general principles, and to indicate their force
and effect by showing the methods, limits and results of their application in
decided cases. Whether this objective was fully accomplished or not, certainly
the purely mechanical approach was avoided and there were provided authoritative illustrations of usage, the material with which to judge the effectiveness
of the "general principles." In this respect, the treatment does not seem to
be any more didactic than the most recent English edition of the text upon
which this treatise is based.
Coode, Legislative Expression.14 -This 49-page pamphlet is an extremely helpful analysis of "legislative expression" that could still prove of
use to the draftsman as well as to the person concerned with statutory construction. Coode breaks down the expression of every law into a legal
subject, the enunciation of the legal action, the description of the case to
which the legal action is confined and, lastly, the conditions on performance
of which the legal action operates. The results are reminiscent of that diagramming of sentences which used to be a method of teaching grammar.
Would it be safe to assume that those who write statutes and those who seek
to find their meaning are no longer in need of some such discipline?
Odgers, The Construction of Deeds and Statutes.15-This recent English
work devotes approximately 160 pages to statutory construction. It purports
to embody the principles set out in the works of Maxwell and Craies and.
to serve as an introduction for those who are beginning a study of the subject.
Historical Works.-Two works which will add much to the understanding of the development of statutory construction in England are Plucknett's
Statutes and Their Interpretationin the First Half of the Fourteenth Century'0 and Thorne's edition of the Ellesmere manuscript, A Discourse upon
the Exposicion & Understandinge of Statutes.17 This sixteenth century
treatise by an unknown author is considered the first distinct account of
14. COODE, LEGISLATIVE ExPREsSIoN: OR, THE LANGUAGE OF THE 'WRITTEN LAW
(1848). Pp. 49. T. & J. W. Johnson, Philadelphia, Pa.
15. ODGERS, THE CONSTRUCTION OF DEEDS AND STATUTES (2d ed. 1946). Pp. xxi,
328. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., London (1st ed. 1939).
16. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY
17. THORNE (ED.),
STATUTES (1942). Pp.

(1922). Pp. xliv, 200. The University Press, Cambridge, England.
A

DISCOURSE

UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDINGE

vii, 194. Huntington Library, San Marino, Calif.

OF
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statutory interpretation in England. Thorne's 100-page introduction refers
to other early works and is itself a major contribution to the general topic
of this symposium.' 8
CASEBOOKS

Casebooks are usually prepared for pedagogical purposes, and it would
not normally seem useful to describe casebooks in an article directed primarily
to the practicing attorney. But most of the casebooks in this field contain far
more than mere collections of cases. The text discussions and other collected
materials not being easily obtained elsewhere, these books constitute valuable
supplements to the treatises. For this reason it has been thought desirable
to describe them individually.
de Sloovere, Cases on Interpretation of Statutes.' 0-This is the pioneer,
and still an extremely valuable, collection of cases, law review materials,
notes, etc., centering on the subject indicated by the title, which may be taken
as covering about one-third of the field developed in many of the more recent
casebooks on Legislation. Legislative procedure and drafting are not given
express attention. The case material is well distributed with respect to the
several states, federal courts and England. There is adequate and interesting
historical material. The four parts of the book are headed, "Preliminary
Problems," "Interpreting the Statute," "Interpreting and Applying the Statute" and "Operation and Effect of Statutes." Others might wish to classify
the material in the Third Part as "The Effect of the Existence of a Statute
on Collateral Issues" and the Fourth Part as "Operative Effect of Statutes
in Time." The Introduction by Dean Pound is noteworthy. It highlights in
three pages the essential characteristics of the problem and the basic dilemma
involved in the need for predictability and the need for a "margin for doing
justice in particular cases." Dean Pound concludes: "Undoubtedly statutory
interpretation is not a simple process of ascertaining, by the help of fixed
canons, the intent of an individual lawgiver with respect to a state of facts
he had in mind and for which he made a logically discoverable provision. To
put it that way gives over-emphasis to the demand of the economic order
for a maximum of predictability. But to give over the postulate of an intent
discoverable by a reasonably predictable course of legal reasoning on the
basis of the given text, over-emphasizes the demands of the individual life.
It is the task of the jurist to work out a theory and method of interpretation
which will give the maximum effect to each of these demands." (P. vii-viii).
18. Other works on the subject which were unavailable for comment are BEAt.,
[(3d ed., Randall, 1924). Pp. xliii. 302.
Stevens & Sons, Ltd., London. (1st ed. 1896)]; and BIsHoP, COMMENTARIES ON THE
WRITTEN LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION [(1882). Pp. viii, 354. Little, Brown & Co.,
Boston].
CARDINAL RULES OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION

19. DF SLOOVERE, CASES ON TlE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

970. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn:

(1931).

Pp. xxiii,
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Horack, Cases and Materials on Legislation.2 0-This casebook led the
way in the presentation in published form of materials dealing broadly with
the legislative process and the legislative product. Four of the book's six
chapters are designed to be informative for those who may be concerned
with formulating a policy to be enacted into legislation, with drafting the
bill embodying such policy and with following such a bill through the
legislature, seeking to influence favorable consideration from that body. Two
chapters are devoted to statutory interpretation but one of these is designed
more specifically for the draftsman and is included in the listing above. The
editor very definitely rejects the idea of emphasizing the "usual approach"
of statutory interpretation. He says in the preface: "This volume . . . preIt assumes that an analysis similar to that made
sents a different thesis ....

of judicial decisions will disclose a legislative common law founded on
recognizable custom, history and precedent which parallels in all essentials
the custom, history and precedent which has made prediction practical in
the field of judicial determination." This "predictability" apparently extends
to the development of legislation as well as statutory construction. A recent
article by the editoi raises the question whether he has abandoned a portion
2
of the announced thesis of this casebook. '
Read and MacDonald, Cases and Other Materials on Legislation.2 2This recent compilation provides a vast store Qf materials and references
adequate for virtually any interest or approach in the field of legislation,
whether it be that of legislative organization and procedure, drafting or
statutory interpretation. The editors include extensive extracts from text
materials as well as decided cases and statutes. The broader "jurisprudential"
aspects are fully developed through materials comparing the growth of the
law through judicial and legislative processes and a chapter on "Fitting
Legislation into a Unified Legal System." Although only one chapter of the
eight in the book is made, by its title, specifically applicable to interpretation
and construction, a much greater proportion of the material is actually relevant to a consideration of these topics. A detailed analytical table of contents
and a full index aid in making this material readily available. The interests
of the legislator, the draftsfnian or the person concerned with securing the
enactment of legislation are, however, given a greater emphasis in the arrangement.
Cohen, Materials and Problems on Legislation.2 3-This relatively short
book (567 pages, plus pocket supplement) introduces a new arrangement
20.

HORACK,

CASES

AND

MATERIALS

ON

LEGISLATION

(1940).

Pp. xxix, 829.

Callaghan & Co., Chicago, Ill.
21. Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 IND. L.J. 335, (1949).
22. READ AND MACDONALD, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION
(1948). Pp. xlviii, 1357. The Foundation Press, Brooklyn, N. Y.

23. COHEN, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON LEGISLATION (1949). Pp. xiv, 567 (with
pocket supplement, 69 pages). The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.

3

and emphasis in casebooks. Primarily the editor is concerned with the tasks
and skills of the lawyer representing his client's interests in legislative matters. He lists seven such lawyer-tasks and only two of these could be carried
on independently of some concern for the legislative process. It is the assumption of the editor that the lawyer, in addition to being called upon to use
legislative materials in the dourts, "must often battle for his client in the
legislative arena." He does not purport to offer too much abundance and
"adjustability" in the materials since "this assumes, too readily, that those
who are presented much and variegated material are already sufficiently
oriented in the field to perform this function [of molding the materials to
the user's plan] expeditiously." A noteworthy contribution is the inclusion
of a number of "problems" involving performance of the "task" under
consideration in the particular chapter. Interpretation and construction are
covered in a chapter entitled, "Ascertaining the 'Meaning' of Ambiguous
Legislative Language." Undoubtedly, this would prove an effective introduction to the subject matter indicated. The background of rules, maxims,
presumptions, etc., is not presented in a complete fashion, and would have
to be picked up by students in the course of research on the problem given
or covered by independent lecture.
Lenhoff, Comments, Cases and Other Materials on Legislation.24-Unlike its 1949 contemporary (Professor Cohen's casebook) this collection is
no streamlined affair. Its 1046 pages, however, still fall short of Read and
MacDonald's 1357. Its two parts, which are accorded substantial equality
in space, are entitled, "The Legislative Process" and "Statutory Interpretation." Even the "legislative process" part, however, is much more thoroughly
"legal" in the traditional sense than is true in the Cohen and Horack books.
For instance, Lenhoff has nothing comparable to detailed development of
the materials on "formulation of legislative policy," "gauging the efficacy of
proposed legislation" and "influencing legislative action" appearing in the
casebooks of these two editors. The author indicates in his preface the materials that bear some relation to such topics and the appendix has some
drafting material, but he deliberately chooses to emphasize materials useful
to the lawyer as a lawyer involved in litigation rather than as a legislator,
a policymaker or a draftsman. As a result, he has much more than either of
the above two editors on other subjects. Some chapters (there are 24) such
as "Mistake of Law" would appear to be unnecessary. In the "statutory
interpretation" part, however, Professor Lenhoff provides solid fare. The
"'rules," maxims, etc., are presented and discussed, frequently in the editor's
own text comments, which are of added value because of his civil law background.
24. LEN OFF, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS
Pp. xxxvii, 1046. Dennis & Co., Inc., Buffalo, N. Y.

ON LEGISLATION

(1949).
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Pound, Outlines of a Course on Legislation.2 5-There are few topics
in the published casebooks that are not set forth or suggested in this remarkable outline--cases, law review materials, illustrative statutes, and, more
than anything else, the-rich contributions from the "jurisprudential" writers
which the author could call into use with such facility. The outline covers
virtually every phase of the subject. Only one of the thirteen chapters is
entitled "Interpretation of Laws."
Parkinson, Cases and Materials on Legislation.26 -"The materials herewith presented for use in the first year course in Legislation in Columbia
Law School are not intended for historical study of legislation or appraisal
of the legislative contribution, but rather as a basis for discussion of the
problems which the formulation of legislation and its enforcement present
to the lawyer." This statement of purpose in the foreword of Professor Parkinson's materials seems to disclaim too much in one respect and promise
coverage that is not fulfilled in another. In his chapter 1, "The Evolution
of Legislative Law Making," there is presented an adequate portion of English
parliamentary history and it is tied in with American materials so that the
beginning student may get contrasts betweens systems of legislative supremacy
and judicial supremacy in lawmaking. There is nothing in this work, however,
treating legislative procedure or drafting, such as might reasonably have
been suggested from the quoted purpose. The materials would appear to be
more Constitutional Law than Legislation as the term is understood today,
but this is undoubtedly explained by the editor's concern for "the fact basis
of legislation," which at the time of his collection might mean life or death
under the substantive due process ideas then enforced by the Supreme Court.
The arrangement still has value, however, in emphasizing the close relationship and interdependence of approaches to constitutionality and to interpretation of statutes, constitutionalism being dominant in one phase of the interpretative process. Chapter 5 of the second volume gives approximately 200
pages to "Statutory Language and Its Interpretation." The coverage is not
exhaustive but suggestive. In addition to cases, text extracts and law review
material, the author frequently presents compact annotations covering historical background and additional materials. The cases used include many
subsequently presented in Cheatham, Dowling and Patterson's Cases on
Legal Method.
LAW REVIEW ARTICLES

Leading articles and student contributions to the law reviews constitute
some of the most helpful materials on the subject of Statutory Construction.
25. POUND, OUTLINES OF A COURSE ON LEGISLATION (1934). Pp. viii, 59. Harvard
Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass. (Paper backed).
26. PARKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1934) 2 vols. (Vol. 1
in 2 parts). (Paper backed).
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to discuss them individually, and about
the best that can be done is to list them under some form of classification,
Preliminary to this, however, specific reference should be made to some
writers who have made extensive and valuable contributions. Thus the many
scholarly articles of the late Professor de Sloovere of New York University
may frequently constitute the starting point for a law review search. 2 7 Reference should also be made to the writings of Max Radin, 28 Frank E. Horack,
Jr.,29 Roscoe Pound, 30 James M. Landis, 3 1 Harry W. Jones,
33

32

Charles B.

34

Nutting and Ernst Freund. Two recent expressions by contemporary
members of the United States Supreme Court should also be noted. 3
The classification under which the articles have been arranged is merely
for the sake of convenience and is not intended to be mutually exclusive.
Iany of the articles might well have been placed under several headings.
1. In General
Amos, Interpretation of Statutes, 5 Camb. L.J. 163 (1934).
Benson, Rules and Aids to Statutory Construction, 1 Va. L. Reg.
512 (1915).
Farley, Interpretation Reinterpreted, 11 Tulane L. Rev. 266 (1937).

(N.s.)

27. Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 407
(1932); Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 1 (1932);
The Functions of Judge and Jury in the Interpretation of Statutes, 46 HAMr. L. REV.
1086 (1933); Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 538 (1934);
Contextual Interpretationof Statutes, 5 FoRD. L. REv. 219 (1936) ; The Equity and Reason
of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591 (1936); Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 88 U. OF PA. L.REv. 527 (1940).
28. Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930); Realism in Statutory
Interpretation and Elsewhere, 23 CAiF. L. REv. 156 (1935); A Short Way With
Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REV. 388 (1942); Early Statutory Interpretation in Entgland,
38 ILL. L.REV. 16 (1943) ; A Case Study in Statutory Interpretation,33 CALIF. .L. REV.
219 (1945).
29. Statutory Interpretation-Lightfrom Plowden's Reports, 19 Ky. L.J. 211 (1931);
In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 119 (1932) ; The Commnon Law of
Legislation, 23 IowA L. REV. 41 (1937); Constitutional Liberties and Statutory Construction, 29 IOWA L. REv. 448 (1944); Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial
Supremacy, 25 TEx. L. REv. 247 (1947); The Disintegration of Statutory Construction,
24 IND. L.J. 335 (1949).
30. Spurious Interpretation,7 COL. L. REV. 379 (1907); Comnnon Law and Legislation, 21 HARv.L. REv. 383 (1908) ; Courts and Legislation, 77 CENT. L.J. 219 (1913),
7 AMf. POL. Sci. REV. 361 (1913).
31. A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARv. L. REV. 886 (1930); Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
32. The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal
Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2 (1939); Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IoWA
L. REv. 737 (1940); Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COL. L. REv. 957
(1940).
33. The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic Evidcnce,
20 B.U.L. REv. 601 (1940); The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L.REV.
509 (1940).
34. Interpretationof Statutes, 65 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207 (1917); Use of Indefinite
Terms in Statutes, 30 YALE L.J. 437 (1921).
35. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2 RECORD 213
(Ass'n of Bar of City of New York 1947), 47 COL. L. REv. 527 (1947); Jackson, The
Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535
(1948), 16 I.C.C. PRac.J. 41 (1948), 8 F.R.D. 121 (1949). Cf. Frank, Words and Music:
Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47 COL. L. REV. 1259 (1947).
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Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on Statutory Interpretation, 47
Col. L. Rev. 1259 (1947).
Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2 Record 213
(Ass'n of Bar of City of New York 1947), 47 Col. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
Freund, Interpretation of Statutes, 65 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 207 (1917).
Friedmann, Statute Law and Its Interpretation in the Modern State, 26
Can. B. Rev. 1277 (1948).
Haywood, Statutes and Interpretation Thereof, 28 Am. L.N. 9 (1917).
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899).
Horack, The Disintegration of Statutory Construction, 24 Ind. L.J. 335
(1949).
Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court
Says, 34 A.B.A.J. 535, 16 I.C.C. Prac. J. 41, 8 F.R.D. 121 (1948).
Pound, Courts and Legislation, 77 Cent. L.J. 219, 7 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 361
(1913).
Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1908).
Radin, Realism in Statutory Construction and Elsewhere, 23 Calif. L. Rev.
156 (1935).
Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936).
Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. Rev. 293, 384 (1945).
Willis, Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell, 16 Can. B. Rev. 1 (1938) (excellent general summary).
2. Approaches to Statutes-The Plain Meaning Rule, The Golden Rule
and the Mischief Rule
Bruncken, Interpretation of the Written Law, 25 Yale L.J. 129 (1915).
de Sloovere, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 Cornell L.Q. 591
(1936).
de Sloovere, Contextual Interpretation of Statutes, 5 Ford. L. Rev. 219
(1936).
de Sloovere, Textual Interpretation of Statutes, 11 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 538
(1934).
Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 Harv. L. Rev.
748 (1935).
Hopkins, The Literal Canon and the Golden Rule, 15 Can. B. Rev. 689
(1937).
Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, 38 W. Va. L.Q. 119 (1932).
Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 Col. L. Rev. 957
(1940).
Loyd, Equity of a Statute, 58 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 76 (1909).
Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MA1inn. L. Rev. 509
(1940).
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Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Col. L. Rev. 379 (1907).
Scott, The Judicial Power to Apply Statutes to Subjects to Which They
Were Not Intended to Be Applied, 14 Temp. L.Q. 318 (1940).
Spencer, Genuine and Spurious Interpretation, 25 Green Bag 504 (1913).
Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 202
(1936).
Statutory Interpretation and the Plain-Meaning Rule, 37 Ky. L.J. 66 (1948).
3. Use of Legislative History and Other Extrinsic Aids
Chamberlain, Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 81 (1933).
de Sloovere, Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes, 88 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 527 (1940).
Emerson and Fuller, How to Find and Use Federal Legislative Materials,
51 W. Va. L.Q. 169 (1949).
Frankham, Some Comments Concerning the Use of Legislative Debates and
Committee Reports in Statutory Interpretation, 2 Brooklyn L. Rev. 173
(1933).
Johnstone, The Use of Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Construction in Oregon,
29 Ore. L. Rev. 1 (1945).
Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 Iowa L. Rev. 737 (1940).
Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in Interpretation of
Federal Statutes, 25 Wash. U.L.Q. 2 (1939).
Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886 (1930).
Meyer, Legislative History and Maryland Statutory Construction, 6 Md.
L. Rev. 311 (1942).
Miller, The Value of Legislative History of Federal Statutes, 73 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 158 (1925).
Nutting, The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic
Evidence, 20 B.U.L. Rev. 601 (1940).
Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 803 (1930).
Weisbard, Role of Court Decisions in Legislative History, 27 Taxes 295
(1949).
Admissibility of Congressional Debates in Statutory Construction by U.S.
Supreme Court, 25 Calif. L. Rev. 326 (1937).
Effect of Legislative History on Judicial Decision, 5 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
235 (1937).
The Inadequacy of Legislative Recording in Iowa, 35 Iowa L. Rev. 88
(1949).
Legislative Materials to Aid Statutory Construction, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 822
(1937).
Nonlegislative Intent as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation, 49 Col. L. Rev.
676 (1949).
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Statutory Construction-Use of Extrinsic Aids in Wisconsin, 1940 Wis. L.
Rev. 453.
The Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation in Kentucky, 36 Ky.
L.J. 190 (1948).
4. Maxims of Construction
Lattin, Legal Maxims and Their Use in Statutory Interpretation, 26 Geo.
L.J. 1 (1937).
McCaffrey, The Rule In Pari Materia As an Aid in Statutory Construction,
3 Law. & L. Notes [No. 3] 11 (Winter 1950).
Mackay, Ejusdem Generis Principle of Interpretation, 90 Cent. L.J. 285
(1920).
Smith, Ejusdem Generis and Civil Rights Statutes, 5 Nat. B.J. 184 (1947).
Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, 15 Marq. L. Rev. 191
(1931).
Williams, The Origin and Logical Implications of the Ejusdem Generis
Rule, 7 Conveyancer N.s. 119 (1943).
Interpretation of Codes by Civil and Common-Law Courts, The Doctrine of
Ejusdem Generis, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 266 (1931).
5. Historical Articles
Horack, Statutory Interpretation-Light from Plowden's Reports, 19 Ky.
L.J. 211 (1931).
Plucknett, Ellesmere on Statutes, 60 L.Q. Rev. 242 (1944).
Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 388 (1942).
Radin, Early Statutory Interpretation in England, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 16 (1943).
6. Comparative Law of Statutory Construction
Gutteridge, A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statute Law, 8
Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1933).
Lenhoff, On Interpretative Theories: A Comparative Study in Legislation,
27 Texas L. REv. 312 (1949).
Interpretation of Codes by Civil and Common-Law Courts, Doctrine of
Ejusdem Generis, 5 Tulane L. Rev. 266 (1931).
7. Statutes as Bases for Aitalogical Reasoning
Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 Iowa L. Rev. 41 (1937).
Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in Harvard Legal Essays 213
(1934).
Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 175.
Reasoning by Analogy From Statute in Pennsylvania, 43 Dick. L. Rev. 234
(1939).
8. Procedure in Statutory Construction
de Sloovere, The Functions of judge and Jury in the Interpretation of
Statutes, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 1086 (1933).
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de Sloovere, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation, 9 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 407 (1932).
de Sloovere, Steps in the Process of Interpreting Statutes, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q.
Rev. 1 (1932).
9. Statutory Construction in ParticularFields

Baker, Judicial Interpretation of Tax Exemption Statutes, 7 Texas L. Rev.
385 (1929).
Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation,
38 W. Va. L.Q. 309 (1932).
Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 10 U. of
Toronto L.J. 286 (1936).
Horack, Constitutional Liberties and Statutory Construction, 29 Iowa L.
Rev. 448 (1944).
Lyon, Old Statutes and New Constitution, 44 Col. L. Rev. 599 (1944).
Mendelson, John Marshall's Short Way With Statutes, 36 Ky. LJ. 284
(1948).
Newman, How Courts Interpret Regulations, 35 Calif. L. Rev. 509 (1947).
Sanagan, The Construction of Taxing Statutes, 18 Can. B. Rev. 43 (1940).
Smith, The Changing Construction of Revenue Laws, 20 A.B.A.J. 12 (1934).
ten Broek, Interpretive Administrative Action and the Lawmaker's Will,
20 Ore. L. Rev. 206 (1941).
Criminal Law and Procedure-Statutory Construction, 32 Mich. L. Rev.
976 (1934).
The Supreme Court on Administrative Construction as a Guide in Interpretation of Statutes, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 469 (1927).
10. Miscellaneous

Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 Harv. L.
Rev. 370 (1947).
Freund, The Use of Indefinite Terms in Statutes, 30 Yale L.J. 437 (1921).
Horack, Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 Tex. L.
Rev. 247 (1947).
Jacobson, Federal Interpretation of State Law, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 335
(1938).
Mann, The Interpretation of Uniform -Statutes, 62 L.Q. Rev. 278 (1946).
Stem, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv.
L. Rev. 76 (1937).
Sutton, Use of "Shall" in Statutes, 4 John Marshall L.Q. 204 (1938).
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
77 (1948).
Indefinite Criteria of Definiteness in Statutes. 45 Harv. L. Rev. 160 (1931).
Statutes-Constructioni-Effect Given to Practical Construction, 20 Minn. L.
Rev. 56 (1935).

